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94 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
point the Federal Bills of Lading Act (39 Stat. 542, 44 U. S. C. 102) vir-
tually adopted, in section 22, the former minority view imposing liability on a
carrier whose agent issued a bill of lading without all or any part of the
goods having been delivered to it. The Uniform State Bills of Lading
Act, similar on this point to the Federal act, has been adopted by the fol-
lowing states: Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin,
Alaska, and the Philippine Islands.
The Federal court below found for the carrier, arguing that the Bills of
Lading Act did not cover a situation in which the employee's act was en-
tirely in furtherance of selfish motives. Seaboard Air Line R. v. Gleason
(C. C. A. 5, 1927), 21 F. (2d) 883. The Supreme Court, however, notes
no difference between this situation and the one in which the employee's
default is actuated by other sinister motives or by negligence. This view
represents the general weight of authority. Planters' Rice-Mill Co. V.
Merchants' Nat. Bank (1887), 78 Ga. 574, 3 S. E. 327; MeCord v. Western
Union Telegraph Co. (1888), 39 Minn. 181; Lloyd v. Grace (1912), A. C.
716, 5 B. R. C. 498. The Supreme Court does not base liability on the ap-
parent or implied authority of the agent to issue the bill of lading, for he
had no such authority. The forgery was entirely outside the master's
business. The carrier is held liable on the apparent authority of the agent
to tell plaintiff whether or not the goods had arrived. But section 22 of
the Bills of Lading Act applies to the carrier whose agent had the actual
or apparent authority to issue the bill. This decision expands the rule as
laid down in the Bills of Lading Act to take in a new and slightly differ-
ent situation. B. L. W., '31.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS OF LAw-C1MzPULSORY EDUCATION
STATUTES.-Complaints were filed by the State of New Hampshire against
the named defendant and others, charging in each case a failure to cause a
child of defendant to attend public or approved private schools, as required
by Public Laws 1926, c. 118, secs. 1, 2. The defense was that in each case
the child was being taught by a private tutor in his own home in the studies
required to be taught in the public schools to one of his age. The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held the statute not unconstitutional as against
the guaranty of liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. State v. Hoyt (N. H. 1929), 146 Atl. 170.
The constitutionality of general compulsory education statutes, requiring
children between certain specified ages to attend schools, has been affirma-
tively determined. 35 Cyc. 1122; 24 R. C. L. 621; Ann. Cas. 1912A, 373;
State v. Bailey (1901), 157 Ind. 324, 61 N. E. 730; State v. Jackson (1902),
71 N. H. 552, 53 Atl. 1021. Likewise, compulsory vaccination statutes have
been rather universally upheld, as have statutes penalizing parents and
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
custodians for failure to cause children to attend school as required in
states where such vaccination statutes are in force. Jacobson v. Mass.
(1905), 197 U. S. 11; Zucht v. King (1922), 260 U. S. 174; Barber v.
School Board of Rochester (N. H. 1926), 135 Atl. 159.
The power of the state over education has been somewhat limited, how-
ever, by recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. A
prohibition of teaching the German language to children under fourteen,
unless they have completed eighth grade work, was declared to be an in-
fringement of the guaranty of liberty found in the Fourteenth Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States. Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), 262
U. S. 390; Bartels v. Iowa (1923), 262 U. S. 404, Holmes and Sutherland
JJ. dissenting. In Hawaii a statute containing regulations of private for-
eign language schools attended by children who at the same time were
compelled to attend public schools was held to abuse the privileges and
immunities of citizens, and to deprive them of liberty and property with-
out due process of law. Farrington v. T. Tokushige (C. C. A. 9, 1926), 11
F. (2d) 710. And an Oregon statute requiring all children to attend the
public school was declared invalid for a like reason. Pierce v. Society
(1925), 268 U. S. 510.
Justification of the decision in the principal case is made on the theory
of the state's power to require attendance at schools and reasonably to
regulate all schools. In the Pierce case, supra, it was said that there was
no question raised as to "the power of the state reasonably to regulate all
schools, to inspect, supervise, and examine them, their teachers and pupils;
to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that teachers
shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that noth-
ing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare." Citing
the above quotation, the New Hampshire court maintains (p. 171) that
under the interpretations of the Federal guaranty of liberty, so far as it
has been declared, "it appears that attendance at some school may be re-
quired and that the state may supervise the school attended. The power
to supervise necessarily involves the power to reject the unfit, and to make
it obligatory to submit to supervision. The local statute does not go be-
yond these requirements." It is not sufficient that equivalent unsuper-
vised instruction be given. The authorities, as understood, "do not deny
the power of the state to insist upon an approval of the proposed substitute
for public school attendance."
No court decision attempts to lay down the conditions which constitution-
ally may be provided as prerequisite to the state's approval of private
schools. The extent to which such supervision may be carried remains to
be determined by future decisions. That the state may demand institutional
education but may not demand that the institution be public or that it re-
frain from teaching foreign languages-these guide posts are all that have
as yet been established. The decision in the principal case seems reason-
able as well as in accord with authority; for state supervision of home
training would manifestly be impossible. C. V. E., '31.
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